It is unclear whether Descartes truly understood and satisfactorily addressed Caterus’ worries. However, the clarification of the notion of objective being he provided in the First Set of Replies is sufficient for our purposes. Descartes acknowledges that the phrase “object of thought” is ambiguous between (2) and (3). He remarks that Caterus’ objection that “objective being is simply a determination of an act of the intellect by means of an object, and this [objective being] is merely an extraneous label which adds nothing to the thing itself ” is based on misunderstanding “objective being” as referring to “the thing itself as if it were located outside the intellect” (CSM II 74; AT VII 102). If this 8 Brown (2006), p. 86. Descartes’ account of ideas 15 were the case, Descartes admits, “objective being is certainly an extraneous label” since it does not add anything to the sun existing in the sky (“For example, if anyone asks what happens to the sun through its being objectively in my intellect, the best answer is that nothing happens to it beyond the application of an extraneous label [ . . . ]” CSM II 74; AT VII 102). But, Descartes goes on: [When I was speaking of “objective being in the intellect”] I was speaking of the idea [as opposed to the thing itself existing outside the idea], which is never outside the intellect, and in this sense “objective being” simply means being in the intellect in the way in which objects are normally there. (CSM II 74; AT VII 102) Then, Descartes illustrates the way in which things are normally in the mind with the example of the sun: For example, if anyone asks what happens to the sun through its being objectively in my intellect, the best answer is that [the sun] is in the intellect in the way in which its objects are normally there. By this I mean that the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect not of course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, i.e., in the way in which objects normally are in the intellect. (CSM II 75; AT VII 102) In the two passages just quoted Descartes clarifies that we ought to understand his claim that “the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect” as the claim that the idea of the sun contains the (true) representation of the sun. So, these two passages from Descartes’ replies to Caterus confirm that “the object of thought” has to be taken, according to (2) above, as the presentation (or description) of the object rather than the object itself. But the exchange with Caterus also tells us something more about the relation between the presentational content of the idea and its referential content. Descartes is saying here that the idea is not simply a sign for its referent but provides the necessary and sufficient condition for identifying the referent by providing the “true” description of the object (“the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect”).9 9 Notice that my reading of Descartes’ claim that “the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect” as the claim that the idea of the sun contains the true representation of the sun is my way of denying that Descartes is postulating third things between the mind and external reality, as (1) above implies. Thanks to Thomas Vinci for pointing 16 Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation Finally, at the beginning of Meditation Six Descartes writes about the idea of the chiliagon: [ . . . ] if I want to think of a chiliagon, although I understand that it is a figure consisting of a thousand sides just as well as I understand the triangle to be a three sided figure, I do not in the same way imagine the thousand sides [ . . . ]. It is true that since I am in the habit of imagining something whenever I think of a corporeal thing, I may construct in my mind a confused representation of some figure; but it is clear that this is not a chiliagon. For it differs in no way from the representation I should form if I were thinking of a myriagon, or any figure with many sides. (CSM II 50; AT VII 72) Descartes writes that an idea is the idea of a chiliagon (as opposed to that of a myriagon) only if the mind presents to itself (or sees by introspection) a chiliagon which is distinct from a myriagon. This, as Wilson (1990) puts it, “suggests that an idea’s referentially representing a does depend on the idea’s somehow presentationally exhibiting a.”10 In conclusion, all this textual evidence indicates that, according to Descartes, the identity of an idea does not depend on the actual existence of the object represented. An idea is individuated by a mode of presentation of the object independently of whether the object exists. Whether ideas are, or have, representational contents, these contents are internally determined as opposed to being relationally, or externally, determined. The representation of the object comes from the mind in the way of a presentation of the object.11 A direct implication of this presentational model of ideas is an internalism (certainly compatible with Descartes’ nativism) according to which the representational content of ideas is determined by the ways in which we describe objects rather than in virtue of a mind world relation. this out to me. Keeping this in mind is important because this passage could easily be interpreted, and it has been interpreted, as supporting (1) (in as long as Descartes here seems to commit himself to two forms of being, formal and objective being). In my view, Descartes here is simply saying that the idea of the sun contains the identifying properties of its referent, i.e., the sun. That is, according to my reading, Descartes thinks that ideas are directed to real objects not by intentional objects but by their properties. See, on this, Normore (1986) p. 234 and Vinci (1998), pp. 61 64. 10 See Wilson (1990), reprinted in Wilson (1999), p. 82. 11 The key issue here is the individuation of ideas. What I am arguing is that they are individuated independently of what they are actually related to and, hence, as we shall see later, that the referential relation is mediated by the presentational content. Descartes’ account of ideas 17 1.2 DESCARTES’ DESCRIPTIVIST ACCOUNT OF IDEAS (DA) On the basis of 1.1 above, we can conclude that Descartes held what I will call a “descriptivist account of ideas” (DA) whose basic tenets are: (DA) (I) Ideas are individuated by their mode of presentation of an object (or objective reality).12 (II) The mode of presentation provides an identifying description of the object. (III) The mode of presentation of an idea determines its object so that the idea refers to whatever corresponds to (or satisfies) its mode of presentation. (I) (III), imply (IV): for an idea to be an idea of n it cannot represent n as other than n is (on pain of not being the idea of n).13 Let me make two general remarks about DA. First, DA is modeled after the clear and distinct ideas of the intellect since, according to Descartes, those are the ideas that present the object to the mind as it actually is. I take (II) to be implied by Descartes’ example that the idea of the sun is the sun itself as it exists in the mind.14 This is confirmed by Descartes’ remark, in his exchange with Arnauld that we must distinguish between 12 Ideas so individuated are “abstract” ideas in the sense that they represent particular objects and are tokened by different minds or by the same mind at different times. The details of how an abstract idea is related to its tokenings in the mind and the particular objects represented are not relevant in this context. Notice, however, that attributing this view to Descartes does not necessarily commit him to maintain that abstract ideas are abstract objects really distinct from both the finite mind and particular objects, since it is possible to think of abstract ideas as general and innate ways of conceiving of particular things. Despite the presence of a few passages where Descartes seems to suggest that ideas of mathematics are ideas of abstract objects (i.e., “true and immutable essences”) which are really distinct from particular objects (for example, CSM II 44 45; AT VII 64), in the Principles of Philosophy (among other texts) Descartes seems to hold the view that abstract ideas are innate ways of thinking of particular objects (see, for example, CSM I 211 212; AT VIIIA 26, 27, 28). On this issue, see Bolton (1998), Chappell (1997), Nolan (1997) (1998), Rozemond (2008) and De Rosa and Bueno (2008). 13 In De Rosa (2004), I called this account of ideas the “presentational account” (see De Rosa (2004), p. 263). 14 In Meditation Three, Descartes claims that there are two ideas of the sun. There is the sensory idea that misrepresents the sun as something small; and then there is the correct idea of the sun obtained through astronomical reasoning. I am assuming here that Descartes is talking about the latter in the above example. 18 Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation obscure and confused ideas, on the one hand, and clear and distinct ones, on the other. To Arnauld’s objection that the notion of material falsity is inconsistent with DA’s tenet that “the idea of x is just x itself as it exists in the understanding” (our (II) above) Descartes clarifies that this principle only applies to clear and distinct ideas: When [Arnauld] says that the idea of cold “is coldness itself in so far as it exists objectively in the intellect” I think we need to make a distinction. For it often happens in the case of confused and obscure ideas and the ideas of heat and cold fall into this category that an idea is referred to something other than that of which it is in fact the idea. (CSM II 163; AT VII 233) In the above passage, (more or less explicitly) Descartes claims that Arnauld’s objection (viz., that Descartes’ tenet makes it impossible for the idea of cold to be materially false) is ill-founded because the idea of cold is an obscure and confused idea and the tenet applies to ideas that are not obscure and confused, that is, (presumably) clear and distinct ideas. Second, (III) illustrates Descartes’ views on reference. It claims that, according to Descartes, the object of the idea (or referent) is the object that, if it existed, would satisfy the description (of the object) contained in the idea.15 Notice, moreover, that (III) claims that an object is the referent of a certain idea if it satisfies (or corresponds to) the presentation of the object without implying that there must be a resemblance between the represented object and the actual object.16 15 The idea of God may seem to provide a counterexample to the above definition since in Meditation Three Descartes claims that we could not have the (clear and distinct) idea of God unless God existed and caused it in us. And this may suggest that Descartes offers a causal account of (at least) the idea of God. Besides the fact that the idea of God is unique and, so, the account of its content cannot be extended to the rest of ideas, this is not even what Descartes maintains about the idea of God. Descartes infers that God exists and is the cause of the idea in us because of the way in which we clearly and distinctly represent him in our minds. 16 DA is similar to what Margaret Wilson calls a “presentational account of ideas” (see Wilson (1990), reprinted in Wilson (1999), p. 73). But despite the similarities in formulation, there is a crucial difference between DA and the “presentational account of ideas” that Wilson attributes to Descartes. By attributing this account to Descartes, Wilson attributes to him a theory of ideas that has nothing to do with the referential relation. But, according to DA, Descartes is committed to the view that there must be a correspondence between the presentational and referential contents so that an idea cannot refer to anything other than what the idea presents to the mind. I call my reading of Descartes’ theory a “descriptivist account” in order to indicate that Descartes is a “descriptivist” about reference. Descartes’ account of ideas 19 1.3 DESCARTES ON SENSORY IDEAS OF SECONDARY QUALITIES: THE TEXTUAL DATA Descartes didn’t always call ideas of secondary qualities “materially false.”17 However, as I will argue, he did hold the consistent view, throughout his whole body of work, that ideas of sense misrepresent the material world insofar as they are obscure and confused ideas that represent their objects (i.e., bodies) as something other than they actually are (that is, as instantiating properties they do not actually instantiate).18 In Meditation Three, after claiming that all ideas are “as it were the images of things” (CSM II 25; AT VII 37), Descartes writes that material falsity belongs to ideas of colors, sounds, smell (CSM II 30; AT VII 43) and it occurs when these ideas “represent non-things as things” (CSM II 30; AT VII 43). Here’s the famous passage: [ . . . ] material falsity [ . . . ] occurs in ideas when they represent non things as things. For example, the ideas I have of heat and cold contain so little clarity and distinctness that they do not enable me to tell whether cold is merely the absence of heat or vice versa, or whether both of them are real qualities, or 17 As we shall see, Descartes introduces the notion of material falsity in Meditation Three (CSM II 30; AT VII 43). Then, he discusses it again in the Fourth Set of Replies (CSM II 163 164; AT VII 232 235) and in Conversation with Burman (CSMK 337; AT V 152). 18 For a different view, see for example, Wilson (1978), chapter three and Vinci (1998), chapter seven. According to both Wilson (1978) and Vinci (1998), Descartes’ views on sensory ideas changed over time. Both claim that in Meditation Three, Descartes still acknowledged that sensations are representational by calling them “materially false.” According to Wilson (1978), Descartes is saying that sensations still seem to represent something in the external world but they do not actually represent anything. According to Vinci, Descartes is saying that ideas of sense represent whiteness, redness and so on (which are nothing but sensations) as “quasi-substantial entit[ies] that [are] more than mere mode[s] of substances” (see Vinci (1998), p. 185). But both Wilson (1978) and Vinci (1998) agree that by the time Descartes wrote the Principles he had abandoned the view that sensations are representational altogether. I will argue against this reading of the Principles in the following chapters. It is worth noticing that Margaret Wilson changed her mind about this issue in Wilson (1990) and argued for a consistency between Descartes’ earlier and later texts. Cecilia Wee has argued that Descartes is already changing his definition of material falsity in his replies to Arnauld (see Wee (2006), chapter one). Since I became aware of Wee’s book only after I had completed the writing of my book, I was unable to give her views the full consideration that they deserve in this context. For a brief discussion of Wee’s views, see De Rosa (2008). 20 Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation neither is. And since there can be no ideas which are not as it were of things, if it is true that cold is nothing but the absence of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive deserves to be called false [ . . . ]. (CSM II 30; AT VII 43 44) Literally speaking, according to this passage, a materially false idea is an idea that represents a non-entity (i.e., an impossible object) as an entity (i.e., a possible object) or, as Descartes puts it, a privation as something positive.19 However, the literal meaning cannot be what Descartes had in mind, for several reasons. First, secondary qualities can be either positive or privative properties (if cold is the absence of heat, then heat must be something positive) and, so, at least some ideas of secondary qualities (on the assumption that they represent their objects as something positive) would be materially true. But Descartes suggests that both the ideas of heat and cold may fail to represent real qualities (“they do not enable me to tell whether cold is merely the absence of heat or vice versa, or whether both of them are real qualities, or neither is”) and, hence, be materially false.20 Second, it is at least prima facie inconsistent with Descartes’ own theory of ideas to claim that an idea “refers” to a certain object (a nonthing) but presents a different one to the mind (a positive thing). If this were the case, then, to use the terminology introduced in the above section, an idea would have a presentational content that is different 19 The term “thing” here is used loosely to mean anything real whether that is a substance or property of a substance. This is confirmed by the quotation above. 20 For a similar point see Wilson (1978), p. 109; and Field (1993), p. 317. Moreover, is it even possible for an idea to represent nothing? If Descartes’ account of mental representation consists in his theory of objective being, then it is impossible for an idea to represent a complete non-thing. For a literal reading of this passage, see Catherine Wilson (2003), pp. 92 93 and p. 98; Vinci (1998), pp. 184 187; and Wee (2006), chapters one and three. According to Wilson (2003), Descartes introduces ideas of privations to contrast them with the idea of God and as a way of setting up the proof for the existence of God in Meditation Three. I disagree with this way of reading the passage not only for the reasons listed above, but also because Descartes continues the discussion of material falsity with Arnauld and this discussion seems to be about a deeper notion than Wilson (2003) wants it to be. Besides, in reply to Arnauld’s pressing criticisms, Descartes would have had the perfect occasion to downplay the notion of material falsity. But he did not. According to Vinci, materially false ideas represent a non-thing (whiteness as it is in itself, that is, a mode of the sensuous mind) as a real quality or quasi-substantial entity. I disagree with this reading because I believe that Descartes is here using “thing” loosely to mean any real property. For my disagreement with Wee, see De Rosa (2008). Descartes’ account of ideas 21 from its referential content. But, as we saw above, DA’s (I) (III) imply that an idea of n cannot represent n as other than n is (on pain of not being the idea of n). Besides, Descartes’ causal principle, in Meditation Three, states that the objective reality of an idea is the mirror image of the formal reality of the object being represented (“[ . . . ] in order for a given idea to contain such and such objective reality, it must surely derive it from some cause which contains at least as much formal reality as there is objective reality in the idea,” CSM II 28 29; AT VII 41). As we shall see in more detail in the following section, Arnauld first pointed out that the notion of material falsity is inconsistent with Descartes’ own theory of ideas and related principles. He noted that an idea, according to Descartes’ own principles, cannot refer to an object x (a non-entity) but exhibit an object y (an entity) to the mind: [ . . . ] there cannot be an idea of cold which represents it to me as a positive thing [because] [ . . . ] what is the idea of cold? It is coldness itself in so far as it exists objectively in the intellect. But if cold is an absence, it cannot exist in the intellect by means of an idea whose objective existence is a positive entity. Therefore, if cold is merely an absence, there cannot be a positive idea of it, and hence there cannot be an idea which is materially false. (CSM II 145; AT VII 206) Arnauld claims that Descartes’ principles make it impossible for him to hold the view that an idea refers to one object but presents a different one to the mind.21 Each idea is, in and by itself, necessarily true of the object that it exhibits to the mind. He concludes, then, that Cartesian ideas cannot literally represent non-things as things. Finally, as Arnauld pointed out, “what is the cause of the positive objective being which according to you is responsible for the idea’s being materially false? ‘The cause is myself ’, you may answer, ‘in so far as I come from nothing.’ But in that case, the positive objective being of an idea can come from nothing, which violates the author’s most important principles” (CSM II 146; AT VII 207). Arnauld’s point is as follows: sensory ideas present something positive to us; but if Descartes holds the view that they come from nothing, then the causal principle is violated (since the objective reality of the idea would be greater than the reality of the object that causes it). But this is a 21 See Bolton (1986) on this. 22 Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation possibility Descartes cannot allow for since it would threaten the proof for the existence of God in Meditation Three. In light of these considerations, I conclude that by calling sensory ideas “materially false” Descartes did not mean to say literally that they represent non-things as things. Instead he meant to say metaphorically that sensory ideas misrepresent their objects or represent their objects as other than they are. However, a pressing question remains. If sensory ideas are “materially false” in the metaphorical sense of being misrepresentations of their objects, in what sense shall we interpret the phrase ideas of sense represent their objects as other than they are vis-a`-vis DA’s implication that an idea cannot refer to one object and present another to us? There are at least two options here (at least within a representationalist reading of Cartesian sensations).22 Either Descartes’ account of sensory representation wreaks havoc with DA (and, as we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4, this is what externalist readings of Cartesian sensations claim) or it is possible to explain Descartes’ notion of sensory misrepresentation in a way that is consistent with DA. In my view, the second option represents Descartes’ considered position and I will defend this reading in Chapter 5. For the time being, I only want to note that Descartes begins to provide an answer to this question in his replies to Arnauld’s objections. Descartes acknowledges Arnauld’s point that the idea of cold cannot represent cold as other than it actually is: [ . . . ] my critic asks what the idea of cold, which I described as materially false, represents to me. If it represents an absence, he says, it is true; and if it represents a positive entity, it is not the idea of cold. This is right ; but my only reason for calling the idea “materially false” is that, owing to the fact that it is obscure and confused, I am unable to judge whether or not what it represents to me is something positive which exists outside of my sensation. And hence I may be led to judge that it is something positive though in fact it may merely be an absence. (CSM II 164; AT VII 234, emphasis added) In the above passage, Descartes acknowledges Arnauld’s objection and, as a result, he clarifies that sensory ideas misrepresent their objects 22 As I already anticipated in the Overview, it is possible to avoid this question altogether by denying that Cartesian sensations are representational. But I will argue against this reading of Cartesian sensations in Chapter 2 below. Descartes’ account of ideas 23